

A STATEMENT – ONCE AND NOW

Herta Müller, born in Banat, Romania, was awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Literature. The most distinguished professional award given to the German-Schwab writer has consequences other than literary ones. “She managed to get the anti-minority Romanian propaganda, which tends to homogenize the structure of the population, onto its knees. Furthermore, she forces the Romanian society to face the mirror, or, in other words, to discuss a topic, which has been kicked under the carpet or placed into the dunce’s seat, namely about minorities,” Marius Cosmeanu wrote.

According to another Romanian writer, Ion Bogdan Lefter, Herta Müller’s Nobel Prize is going to generate an international response and dialogue, which will reveal that “Romania is much like every other state characterized by multi-ethnicity. It explicitly implies that the first paragraph of the Romanian Constitution is hypocritical and peremptory, limited, and nationalist. In addition, it highlights that a “non-Romanian” can also become the representative of the Romanians and our mutual, multinational, and multilingual culture. Once we analyze Herta Müller’s prose and themes pertaining to the Romanian and German people’s life in the Banat region, one must acknowledge that the Romanian majority sometimes – often? always? – discriminated against national minorities.”

After the Trianon Peace Treaty, 800,000 Germans resided in Transylvania, but today they number in the tens of thousands. Our Hungarian community in Transylvania, however, expresses daily its wish that it does not want to share the fate of the Transylvanian Germans. Our Hungarian community in Transylvania had to wait until 2006 for an official document adopted by the Romanian Parliament to acknowledge the anti-Hungarian politics of the Romanian regime. Inside it, the Romanian government acknowledges for the first time that the state had practiced a sinful, anti-minority policy designed to refract the inner spirit of the Hungarian community.

Though oscular and partial, the special Tismaneanu Report¹ reveals and acknowledges the sins committed against Hungarians by the Romanian communist regime.

¹ A study of 660 pages, compiled at President Băsescu’s special request by a committee of historians led by Vladimir Tismăneanu, professor and lecturer in the United States of America. The report classified communism as “an unlawful and culpable regime” and holds it guilty and responsible for crimes against humanity.

The report establishes that: “Although the evil conditions of communism had influenced every Romanian citizen in the same way, regardless of their nationality, in some areas the politics represented by the communist authorities had exerted a powerful drawback to the members of the Hungarian minority, which endangered the life, traditions of the community, as well as, defending their language and cultural identity.” The chapter of the report dedicated to minorities deals almost exclusively with the Hungarians. One of its characteristic conclusions is that the communist authorities pragmatically endeavored to break the economic strength of the Hungarian community. After confiscating our private, church, and community properties, they crushed the balance of our inner spirit, in order to prevent our national community from developing its inherent and latent talent.

The destructive process set in motion by the anti-minority policy, which endangered our community’s very existence, did not come to a standstill after the 1989 regime-change, moreover, it was strengthened. Proven by the official census prepared between 1992 and 2002, it is a fact that the number of Hungarians decreased by 200,000. Compared to the ethnic Romanian 5% diminution, the Hungarian population loss reached 12%.

Supported by statistics, the study, entitled: “What’s Behind a Statement?” by László Tőkés, Bishop of the Királyhágómellék Reformed Church District, was published in 1993. It offers a thorough picture of the extent and efficiency of the bloodless “ethnic cleansing” against the Transylvanian Hungarian community. The processes and consequences presented in the study, as well as, the ensuing conclusions all remain true and valid to the present day. Therefore, we republish it in its entirety.

In addition, we will augment the original publication with our report, which updates the data for the period after 1993, based on census data and relevant statistics. The data charts published in the following section clearly highlight that even after the 1989 regime-change political homogenization has continued, without interruption. In fact, it has been practiced on the state level, with methodical organization.

During the decade between the 1992 and 2002 census, Romania lost 4.95% of its total population or a decrease of 1.1 million people (Table 1). Regardless, the ethnic Romanian majority remained constant at 89.5% of the total population.

In contrast, the ethnic Hungarian population decreased by 193,152 people (from 1,624,959 to 1,431,807), but amounted to a staggering population loss of 11.88%. Further, the ethnic Hungarian population declined proportionately from 7.1% to 6.6%, during the same period.

Several decades ago, the Romanian government started a “forced assimilation policy.” Initially, it changed the ethnic composition of central Transylvania. Later, it focused on the Transylvanian territories along the Hungarian border. Ever since then, the proportion of the Hungarian population has been gradually decreasing.

The artificially contrived intra-migration and subsequent “forced assimilation” significantly impacted the Hungarian population of Transylvanian counties and cities. In Romania, the total national population decreased 4.949%, while the Romanian population decreased 4.943%, slightly less. However, these seemingly “similar” figures, whose difference is 0.006% masked a drastic decline in the Hungarian population of 11.88%.

The ethnic Hungarian population exhibited genuine diminution. In fact, as a “diminutive” minority, the Hungarian inverse “fragile factor” is 13.5 – relative to the Romanian majority – who dominate their nation. The “fragile factor” is a mathematical measure of “population power” present in a given country.

The 2002 ethnic Hungarian “fragile factor” calculation is: $19,399,597 / 1,431,807 = 13.5$. In simple terms, the relocation of one ethnic Hungarian out of Transylvania is comparable to 13.5 Romanians moving into Transylvania under the “forced assimilation” policy.

TABLE 1

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIANS’
NUMBER AND PROPORTION IN ROMANIA BETWEEN 1992-2002**

	1992		2002		Decrease	
	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	22,810,035	100.0	21,680,974	100.0	-1,129,061	-4.949
Romanian	20,408,542	89.471	19,399,597	89.477	-1,008,945	-4.943
Hungarian	1,624,959	7.124	1,431,807	6.631	-193,152	-11.886

Among 16 Transylvanian counties, there are only two (i.e., Covasna and Harghita), where the proportion of Hungarians exceeds 50% (Table 2). Consequently, only these two counties have a mathematical chance to elect Hungarians as county government executives.

All 16 Transylvanian counties experienced population diminution, between the 1992 and 2002 census. While the total ethnic Hungarian population decreased 11.88% in nominal terms, their diminution by county ranged between 6.46% and 26.05%, with a median of 15.66%. By any measure, these rates of change are staggering.

In every single county, Hungarian diminution exceeded the national Romanian population loss of 4.95%.

Based on our accumulated experience over 20 years, we recognize that the infrastructure progress can be defended, in Transylvanian settlements inhabited by a Hungarian majority, if the county councils effectively represent the interests of the settlements. Nevertheless, even in this case, as government representatives, the county prefects possess the right to overrule laws passed by local councils and the county itself.

These overriding powers subjugate the ethnic Hungarians – even if they represent a majority population. Such detrimental prefect power and excessive bureaucratic government doom the Hungarian minority to perpetual population diminution. Adding insult to injury, there is not one single Hungarian prefect in office – even in the counties where ethnic Hungarians exceed well over 70% of the population.

TABLE 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIANS' NUMBER AND PROPORTION IN TRANSYLVANIAN COUNTIES BETWEEN 1992-2002

County	Year	Total	Ethnicity			
			Romanian	%	Hungarian	%
Fehér/Alba	1992	413,919	372,951	90.10	24,765	5.98
	2002	382,747	346,059	90.41	20,684	5.40
		-31,172	-26,892	-7.21	-4,081	-16.45
Arad/Arad	1992	487,617	392,600	80.51	61,011	12.51
	2002	461,791	379,451	82.17	49,291	10.67
		-25,826	-13,149	-3.35	-11,720	-19.21
Bihar/Bihor	1992	638,863	425,097	66.54	181,703	28.44
	2002	600,246	404,468	67.38	155,829	25.96
		38,617	-20,629	-4.85	-25,874	-14.24

County	Year	Total	Ethnicity			
			Romanian	%	Hungarian	%
Besszterce- Naszód/ Bistrita- Nasaud	1992	326,820	295,549	90.43	21,098	6.45
	2002	311,657	281,273	90.25	18,349	5.85
		-15,163	-14,276	-4.83	-2,749	-13.02
Brassó/ Brasov	1992	643,261	553,101	85.98	63,558	9.88
	2002	589,028	514,161	87.29	50,956	8.65
		-54,233	-38,940	-7.04	-12,602	-19.83
Krassó- Szörény/ Caras- Severin	1992	376,347	325,758	86.56	7,876	2.09
	2002	333,219	294,051	88.24	5,824	1.75
		-43,128	-31,707	-9.73	-2,052	-26.05
Kolozs/Cluj	1992	736,301	571,275	77.59	146,186	19.85
	2002	702,755	557,891	79.39	122,301	17.40
		-33,546	-13,384	2.31	-23,885	-16.34
Kovászna/ Covasna	1992	233,256	54,586	23.40	175,502	75.24
	2002	222,449	51,790	23.28	164,158	73.79
		-10,807	-2,796	-5.20	-11,314	-6.46
Hargita/ Harghita	1992	348,335	48,948	14.05	295,104	84.72
	2002	326,222	45,870	14.06	276,038	84.61
		-22,113	-3,078	-6.29	-19,066	-6.46
Hunyad/ Hunedoara	1992	547,950	503,241	91.84	33,849	6.17
	2002	485,712	450,302	92.71	25,388	5.23
		-62,238	-52,939	-10.52	-8,461	-25.00
Máramar- os/Maram- ures	1992	540,099	437,997	81.09	54,902	10.16
	2002	510,110	418,405	82.02	46,300	9.07
		-29,989	-19,592	-4.47	-8,602	-15.66
Maros/ Mures	1992	610,053	317,541	52.05	252,651	44.41
	2002	580,851	309,375	53.26	228,275	39.30
		-30,002	-8,166	-2.57	-24,376	-9.65
Szatmár/ Satu Mare	1992	400,789	234,541	58.52	140,392	35.03
	2002	367,281	216,085	58.83	129,258	35.19
		-33,508	-18,456	-7.87	-11,134	-7.93
Szilágy/ Salaj	1992	266,797	192,552	72.17	63,151	23.67
	2002	248,015	176,671	71.23	57,167	23.05
		-18,782	-15,881	-8.25	-5,984	-9.47

County	Year	Total	Ethnicity			
			Romanian	%	Hungarian	%
Szeben/ Sibiu	1992	452,873	397,205	87.71	19,309	4.26
	2002	421,724	382,061	90.59	15,344	3.64
		-31,149	-15,144	-3.81	-3,965	-20.53
Temes/ Timis	1992	700,033	561,200	80.17	62,866	8.98
	2002	677,926	565,639	83.43	50,556	7.45
		-22,107	+4,439	+0.79	-12,310	-19.58

Between the 1992 and 2002 census, the Transylvanian Hungarian population decreased by 188,205 people or 11.73% (Table 3). This tracks perfectly with the total ethnic Hungarian population decrease of 11.88%, since 98.8% of ethnic Hungarians in Romania live in Transylvania ($1,415,718 / 1,431,807 = 0.988$).

Between 1992 and 2002, the proportion of the Transylvanian Hungarian community declined from 20.76% to 19.60%, concurrently, the proportion of the Romanian community increased from 73.59 to 74.68%.

This phenomenon reflects intra-country Romanian migration, which predominantly flows into Transylvanian centers, following the “forced assimilation” policy supported by the Romanian government. The movement started with the Romanian speaking population migrating from the Old Kingdom (Walachia and Moldova) into Transylvanian settlements inhabited by Hungarians.

The phenomenon is best observed in rural and agricultural settlements, where impoverished Hungarian landowners, with forsaken soil, sellout to Romanian settlers, with stronger financial backgrounds. Thus, the ethnic composition of the settlements artificially changes. In accordance with the Romanian Law on Education, the number of newly settled pupils, no matter how small, qualifies for Romanian classes. In turn, this demands the need for a staff of Romanian educators and their families, who are given newly created jobs, which further exacerbates the migration.

Thus, a small Romanian foothold quickly grows and eventually leads to Romanians occupying executive positions. Nationally, the Romanian majority holds a disproportionate number of high positions in the local administration (e.g., post offices, railway stations, police, and social institutions). As this process accelerates, the Romanian expansion (of population) effectively diminishes the proportion of the Hungarian community.

TABLE 3**THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIANS' NUMBER AND PROPORTION IN TRANSYLVANIA BETWEEN 1992-2002**

	Year	Total	Ethnicity			
			Romanian	%	Hungarian	%
Transylvania	1992	7,723,385	5,684,142	73.59	1,603,923	20.76
	2002	7,221,733	5,393,552	74.68	1,415,718	19.60
Difference		-501,652	-209,590	-3.687	-188,205	-11.73

Generally, the largest population loss, averaging 20%, is found in the rural regions (outermost territories), which include: Arad, Brasov, Caras-Severin, Sibiu, and Timis. In these cases, the negative aspect of "forced assimilation" becomes obvious, since the Hungarian school system in these settlements is the worst. In the absence of the necessary funding for the cultural facilities, they are not functioning properly, or are entirely missing. Due to small nominal numbers, the intellectual group responsible for organizing and maintaining the community fabric cannot fulfill its duties.

The limited budget of rural Hungarian families – even if the parents demanded justice – cannot afford to educate their children in city schools that teach in their Hungarian mother tongue. Thus, by default, they must send their children to Romanian schools, which is one of the first steps into "forced assimilation."

In rank order, by population, the largest Hungarian counties include: Harghita, Mures, Bihor, and Cluj. In nominal terms, they experienced the largest population losses but not the largest proportions of diminution (Table 4). However, in these counties, migration for improving the standard of living and low population growth primarily triggered diminution, superseding "forced assimilation."

If the nine-decade pattern of diminution is not altered, even after the 1989 regime-change, it is feared that the rural counties will lose their Hungarian population. Further, the Hungarian counties with significant diminution proportions (15-25%) will ultimately become "island" communities within their own Romanian jurisdictions. Mathematically, ethnic Hungarian communities, with diminution rates exceeding 25%, face literal extinction by the 2032 census.

TABLE 4**THE HUNGARIANS' DIMINUTION IN NUMBER AND PROPORTION IN TRANSYLVANIAN COUNTIES BETWEEN 1992-2002**

No.	County	Inhabitants	%
1.	Bihar	-25,874	-14.24
2.	Maros	-24,376	-9.65
3.	Kolozs	-23,885	-16.34
4.	Hargita	-19,066	-6.46
5.	Brassó	-12,602	-19.83
6.	Temes	-12,310	-19.58
7.	Arad	-11,720	-19.21
8.	Hunyad	-8,461	-25.00
9.	Szeben	-3,965	-20.53
10	Krassó-Szörény	-2,052	-26.05

According to current laws, mother tongue usage is permitted in the administration and justice offices, in cities with at least a 20% minority population. Six of 11 Transylvanian Hungarian cities fall below this parameter, including Transylvania's traditional, yet unofficial capital, Kolozsvár/Cluj-Napoca (Table 5). Its Hungarian population proportion decreased below 20%, during the 1992-2002 decade. As a direct result, in Cluj-Napoca and many other cities, the use of the Hungarian language is prohibited in public offices. Similarly, street-names and public institution figures are exclusively written in Romanian; bilingual labeling in Hungarian is forbidden.

Among 11 Transylvanian cities, there are only five (i.e., Csíkszereda, Marosásárhely, Nagyvárad, Szatmárnémeti, and Sepsiszentgyörgy) where the proportion of Hungarians exceeds 20%. As such, only these five cities theoretically qualify for minority mother tongue usage in administration and justice offices.

Among 11 Transylvanian cities, there are only two (i.e., Csíkszereda / Miercurea Ciuc and Sepsiszentgyörgy / Sfântu Gheorghe), where the proportion of Hungarians exceeds 50%. Consequently, only these two "very small" cities have a mathematical chance to elect Hungarians as local government executives.

Keeping in mind that Romanian elections are always won based on ethnicity, these two cities are the only ones, where a chance exists to elect a Hungarian mayor and form a local council with a Hungarian majority.

Based on our experience with local governments, only a Hungarian majority can defend council resolutions that protect the interests of the ethnic Hungarian community.

TABLE 5

THE CHANGE IN ETHNIC PROPORTION OF 11 TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES INHABITED BY HUNGARIANS (COUNTED FOR 1,000 CITIZENS) BETWEEN 1992-2002

	1992		2002		Difference.	
	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Arad						
Total	190.1	100.0	171.8	100.0	-18.3	-9.6
Romanian	151.3	79.6	143.0	82.7	-8.3	-5.5
Hungarian	29.8	15.7	22.5	13.0	-7.3	-24.5

Nagyvárad	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	220.8	100.0	206.6	100.0	-14.2	-6.4
Romanian	143.2	64.8	145.3	70.3	+2.1	+1.5
Hungarian	73.3	33.2	57.0	27.6	-16.3	-22.2

Csíksereda	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	46.0	100.0	42.1	100.0	-3.9	-8.5
Romanian	7.5	16.3	7.3	17.3	-0.2	-2.7
Hungarian	38.2	83.0	34.4	81.7	-3.8	-9.9

Kolozsvár	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	328.0	100.0	317.9	100.0	-10.1	-3.1
Romanian	248.3	75.7	252.4	79.4	+4.1	+1.6
Hungarian	74.5	22.7	60.3	19.0	14.2	-19.1

Sepsiszentgyörgy	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	68.1	100.0	61.5	100.0	-6.6	-9.7
Romanian	16.0	23.5	14.2	23.0	-1.8	-11.1
Hungarian	50.9	74.7	46.1	74.9	-4.8	-9.4

Marosásárhely	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	163.6	100.0	150.0	100.0	-13.6	-8.3
Romanian	75.8	46.3	75.5	50.3	-0.5	-0.06
Hungarian	83.7	51.1	70.1	46.7	-13.6	-16.2

	1992		2002		Difference.	
Nagybánya	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	148.8	100.0	137.9	100.0	-10.9	-7.3
Romanian	119.5	80.3	114.2	82.8	-5.3	-4.4
Hungarian	25.7	17.5	20.5	14.8	-5.2	-20.2

Szatmárnémeti	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	131.9	100.0	115.1	100.0	-16.8	-12.7
Romanian	72.9	55.3	66.6	57.9	-6.3	-8.6
Hungarian	53.8	40.8	45.3	39.3	-8.5	-1.8

Zilah	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	68.3	100.0	62.9	100.0	-5.4	-7.9
Romanian	54.0	79.1	50.9	80.9	-3.1	-5.7
Hungarian	13.5	19.8	11.0	17.5	-2.5	-18.5

Temesvár	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	334.3	100.0	317.7	100.0	-16.6	-4.9
Romanian	274.2	82.0	271.7	85.5	-0.5	-0.2
Hungarian	32.0	9.6	24.3	7.6	-7.7	-24.1

Brassó	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	323.8	100.0	284.6	100.0	-39.2	-12.1
Romanian	287.6	88.8	258.0	90.7	-29.6	-10.3
Hungarian	31.3	9.7	23.2	8.1	-8.1	-25.8

Note:

- The population figures are in thousands, for example: 31.3=31,300.

In Romania, the total nationwide Hungarian diminution is 11.88%. Between the 1992 and 2002 census, the Transylvanian Hungarian population in 11 "large" cities decreased by approximately 92,000 people or 18.16% (Table 6). However, in the three "major" Transylvanian cities (i.e., Brassó, Kolozsvár, Temesvár) the diminution ranges between 19-26%, which confirms that Hungarians are losing ground on a grand scale.

TABLE 6**THE CHANGE IN ETHNIC PROPORTION IN 11 LARGE TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES, BETWEEN 1992-2002, A SUMMARY**

	1992		2002		Difference	
	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%	Inhabitants	%
Total	2,023.7	100	1,868.1	100	-155.6	-7.69
Romanian	1,450.3	71.66	1,399.1	74.89	-51.2	-3.53
Hungarian	506.7	25.04	414.7	22.2	-92.0	-18.16

The historical and cultural centers of the Transylvanian Hungarian community – Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár), Oradea (Nagyvárad), Satu Mare (Szatmárnémeti), Baia Mare (Nagybánya), Aiud (Nagyenyed), Turda (Torda), Zalău (Zilah) – once were majority Hungarian population centers. But during recent decades, they became majority Romanian settlements. We attribute this to our numerical diminution and mainly to artificial relocation and resettlement policies (Table 7).

At the turn of the millennium (2000), there were only 175 settlements (mostly villages) in Transylvania, where the Hungarian ethnicity exceeded 50%. Due to the continual Hungarian diminution, the entire ethnic Hungarian community is on the verge of being permanently “frozen out” of all political representation.

TABLE 7**THE DIMINUTION IN NUMBERS AND PROPORTION OF HUNGARIANS IN TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES BETWEEN 1992-2002**

No.	City	Inhabitants (thousand)	%
1.	Nagyvárad	16.3	22.2
2.	Kolozsvár	14.2	19.1
3.	Marosvásárhely	13.6	16.2
4.	Szatmárnémeti	8.5	18.8
5.	Brassó	8.1	25.8
6.	Temesvár	7.7	24.1
7.	Nagybánya	5.7	20.2
8.	Arad	7.3	24.5

The repartition of the workforce is quite telling. Based on employment, Hungarians lost ground in the professional branches versus the Romanian population (Table 8). While 4.3% of the Romanian workforce represented in jurisdiction, executive committees, administrative and social institutions, the corresponding Hungarian workforce figure is 3.8%. Based on our experience, the relatively small difference in the proportions is deceptive.

The Hungarian positions are skewed to include a greater proportion of positions among small settlements with limited budgets. (In these cases, the office does not imply either an extended jurisdiction, or significant material benefits.) These positions are concentrated in the Hungarian majority counties (i.e., Covasna and Harghita), where the proportion of local Hungarians holding office exceeds the national average.

Further, the “large” cities (e.g., Cluj-Napoca, Targu Mures, Oradea, Satu Mare) that once nurtured the historical ethnic Hungarian traditions and were inhabited by a Hungarian majority are now mixed. Today, we find fewer Hungarians in middle or high-level executive positions, whether in city administrative positions, decentralized institutions, or executive offices of local state corporations. And these positions are gradually decreasing in number. Obviously, this does not reflect a lack of professional competence by Hungarian employees, but rather reveals a preference for Romanians.

Similarly, the proportion of Hungarian employees in intellectual-spiritual jobs is 6.65% versus 9.32% for Romanian employees. The difference in proportion is attributed to office appointments and hiring practices, as cited above. In addition, there is a discriminatory attitude against Hungarians, which seeks to exclude them from cultural institutions. Since the proportion of Hungarian cultural institutions is quite small, this contributes to a limited number of jobs.

Another factor is the potential pool of Hungarian intellectual candidates. There are fewer Hungarian Universities/Academies offering a university degree in Hungarian, which limits the latent talent pool.

In the fields of skilled and unskilled labor, the proportion of Hungarian employees is higher than the national average. Compared to the Romanian figures, the percent difference between the proportions is a whopping 16-30% higher. Consequently, this indicates that the largest proportion of the Hungarian workforce earns their living working in the lowest wage category. Therefore, the income and earning power realized by the whole Hungarian community is significantly lower than the Romanian majority, on a proportionate basis.

At the same time, it confirms a reduction in the number of Transylvanian Hungarian university and academy graduates, resulting in fewer middle-level civil position applicants. In turn, this adversely limits the economic strength, within the Hungarian community. Consequently, our community is not capable of properly supporting its own civil, cultural, educational, religious, and social institutions.

These primary institutions form the very core of each community. Without their formation, development, and reproduction, their natural life pattern is disrupted and instead, thwarts their conception, stunts their growth, and prohibits their procreation. In which case, the final outcome is extinction, for the ethnic Hungarians.

TABLE 8

THE DIVISION IN EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN THE ROMANIAN AND HUNGARIAN POPULATION IN 2002, BASED UPON PROFESSIONAL AREAS

	Total population	Employees	Jurisdiction, executive committees, administrative and social institutions	%	Intellectual spiritual	%
Total	21,680,974	7,811,733	339,691	4.35	707,544	9.06
Romanian	19,399,597	7,137,231	307,423	4.31	665,245	9.32
Hungarian	1,431,807	481,992	18,465	3.83	32,058	6.65

	Administrative jobs	%	Skilled labor	%	Unskilled labor	%	Army	%
Total	393,063	5.03	1,523,937	19.51	567,240	7.26	41,144	0.0527
Romanian	364,845	5.11	1,364,294	19.11	492,227	6.90	37,406	0.0524
Hungarian	23,892	4.95	130,579	27.09	39,787	8.25	3,019	0.0626

Examining the emigration data between 1994 and 2002, there is a decrease in the number of registered citizens. But this is not relevant, because free employment and change of residence do not necessarily require the emigrant to surrender their citizenship (Table 9). More likely, Transylvanian Hungarian citizens pursue foreign jobs and residence abroad in large numbers, much like the Romanian population.

According to statistics for the period cited, 15,701 Hungarians migrated abroad. Based on the 2002 census, the proportion equates to slightly more than 1% of the Hungarian population. For Romanians, the proportion is almost 0.8%.

The migration of the German minority is nothing short of alarming. Between 1992 and 2002, the total German population decreased from 119,426 to 59,764 people, for a net loss of 59,698 or 50% (no population table shown). Considering its economic, cultural, educational, and inner social organizations, the once very strong German community is now a former shadow of itself.

TABLE 9

MIGRATION FIGURES BETWEEN 1994-2005 (BASED UPON THE DATA PUBLISHED IN ANNALS OF STATISTICS OF THE YEARS 1994-2005)

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Romanian	10,146	18,706	16,767	16,883	15,502	11,283
Hungarian	2,509	3,608	2,105	1,459	1,217	696
German	4,065	2,906	2,315	1,273	775	390

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
Romanian	13,438	9,023	7,465	9,886	11,890	10,301	150,990
Hungarian	788	647	489	661	1,062	460	15,701
German	374	143	67	20	36	93	12,457

The national average of youth attending university education is 5.1%, while the proportion of Hungarian university or academy graduates is 3.6%. The diminution rate is a huge 41.66%.

In elementary schools, the proportion of Hungarian students is 5.59% (55,602) versus a 6.63% proportion of the total population, or a diminution of 18.60% (Table 10). In high schools, the proportion of Hungarian students is 5.53% (127,003) versus a 6.63% proportion of the total population, or a diminution of 19.89%. In universities, the proportion of Hungarian students is 4.87% (27,522) versus a 6.63% proportion of the total population, or a diminution of 36.13%.

On every level of education, the number of Hungarian students is proportionately lower than the number of the Romanian students. But the elementary and grade school levels are not as pronounced as the higher levels. This proves that parents and their children have a strong desire to learn, regardless of discrimination, prejudice, or other circumstances that arise against them.

Nevertheless, discriminatory regulations within the Romanian education system result in lower Hungarian participation rates in higher levels of education. These unfavorable conditions are unlikely to change. Thus, if the Hungarian education opportunities do not improve, the current and future generations will be unable to “reproduce” in adequate numbers to sustain the ethnic Hungarian community. This shortage of intellectual prowess creates a crippling “brain drain” that can never be reversed.

The discriminatory nature of the Romanian school system is highlighted by the fact that 31% of Hungarian students cannot be educated in their mother tongue.

TABLE 10

**COMPLETED STUDIES OF THE POPULATION AGED OVER 6 YEARS
(BASED UPON THE REGISTERS OF THE 2002 CENSUS)**

	Total	Form of Education			
		Higher Education			Technical Training
		Total	Long Term	Short Term	
Total	3,908,489	563,991	532,336	31,655	58,383
Romanian	3,552,394	526,482	497,279	29,203	52,787
Hungarian	215,216	27,522	25,502	2,020	5,083

	Total	Form of Education				
		High School			Secondary	Elementary
		Theoretical	Technical			
Total	2,292,915	716,401	222,028	1,354,486	993,129	
Romanian	2,090,440	665,803	203,188	1,221,449	882,626	
Hungarian	127,003	39,519	13,650	73,834	55,602	

The official statistics used in our analysis prove that the diminution and perdition of our Hungarian community in Transylvania commenced many decades ago. Now, the situation is critical. Our community plight requires swift and radical action. In order to achieve this, we need to rally our own ethnic minority community, cooperate with the Romanian majority, and call for efficacious international assistance.

Since the 1989 regime-change, the Hungarian national community in Romania fights with democratic means, with exclusively peaceful and legal methods. Commensurate with the Romanian majority, the complete and full defense of authentic equality is sought by the minority Hungarian community.

Romania's vehement and dismissive attitude against Hungarian autonomy exposes the Romanian national political strategy that views the "nationality issue" as a problem solved through ethnic homogenization, forced assimilation, and the abolishment of national minorities.

The Romanian Great Assembly held in Alba Iulia proclaiming the secession of Transylvania from Hungary, in 1918, promised autonomy for minorities. Since 1918, those promises have never been kept. Likewise, the Paris Treaty on minorities (1919) and its promulgations for the Szekler and Saxon local governments were never honored either.

Based on our historical experience accumulated over nine decades, it is our belief that this fatal process must come to a prompt standstill and be reversed to preserve the minority Hungarian community. To do so effectively, calls for the granting of a minority and community type of self government.

Within the European Union, autonomous self-rule is an efficacious option that honors the sovereignty of the Romanian state. There is no other viable alternative, except autonomy, for us. The Hungarian community in Transylvania and the Szekler Land can no longer bargain for autonomy.

November 2009

Transylvanian Monitor –
the Minority and Human Rights Watch
of the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania

WHAT'S BEHIND A STATEMENT?

Ethnic cleansing of the Hungarian minority in Romania

In February of this year [1993], a statement was uttered at one of the press conferences of the Washington-based National Press Club. I had declared that in a subtle, bloodless way, an “undeniable ethnic cleansing” had been taking place in Romania now for over seventy years, the result of which hundreds of thousands of ethnic minorities – who, at the time of the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty inhabited this region in significant numbers – had disappeared: either by having become assimilated, or by having been forced to leave their place of birth.

As a result of an expertly prepared and systematically executed nation-wide provocation campaign, helped by the diversionist, Iliescu-sympathizing Romanian national television, the objectionable statement soon became the topic of the day in the country's parliament – highly susceptible to such disturbances – and through the “reporting” of the lawmakers and the conveniently manipulated press it soon became the central topic of the similarly manipulated Romanian public opinion, provoking a general uproar and many outcries.

In a fashion similar to that used by more or less all Romanian governments that have come since Trianon, including the present one, this provocative action, as is well known, elicited unified antipathy and strong protests from within the entire political and public sphere, and in a rarely seen occurrence, it was able to synthesize nearly complete “unity” within the entire majority population, drawing together nearly all Romanian political forces.

What is behind this stance? What is its root cause, how can we find an explanation for the exceptional strength, the unmatched power of the political parties' and public opinion's uproar, for the “national” outcry which often degenerated into political hysteria and severe personal insults?

One would be mistaken to believe that the sole reason for this outburst is the by now famous statement, and its truth content.

The use of the expression “ethnic cleansing” with respect to Romania is by no means new. Without going into an exhaustive process to document this, it should suffice to say that András Sütő has made use of this conceptualization several times during the past few years, and what's more, shortly before the artificially and purposefully provoked scandal which was ignited at the

beginning of March of this year [1993], we had two opportunities to read this very expression in our domestic press. In these cases, however, our fastidious policy-makers did not even raise their eyebrows to the much-decried similar later use of these words.

In the middle of February, more than 94 well-known Hungarian and German intellectuals from Kolozsvár (Cluj) issued a written protest against the policies and practices carried out by Gheorghe Funar – the city’s mayor and the president of the Romanian National Unity Party – who, in their words: “in one of Romania’s and Europe’s important cultural centers, concentrates his primary activities at conducting a cultural “ethnic cleansing” directed at the Hungarian collective spirit, affecting nearly every sphere of Hungarian historical and cultural traditions.”

Such a summary of the situation that can be experienced in Kolozsvár corresponds, in meaning, to the content of the expression used in Washington, D.C. The reference made is to the “undeniable,” “refined and sophisticated,” “peaceful” method, which over many decades has made the situation of the Hungarians of Romania almost unbearable. The situation is mirrored by the weight of Sándor Makkai’s words, the one-time bishop who was forced to leave his parish and his homeland, who said: “It is not possible,” and the paradoxical nature of existence here is reinforced by the poet Sándor Reményik, one attached by “teeth and claws” to his homeland, who echoes the tragic compromise: “As is possible.”

The nation-wide uproar in March, the hysterical pseudo-outcries, the unified positions reminiscent of the Ceausescu-era nationalist loyalty-campaigns show not even a trace of any attempt, by the accusers, to familiarize themselves, investigate the facts and their weight, before making their own statements. By completely ignoring, or downplaying and denying the actual reality, the badly-informed supporters of national loyalty branded the statement a dogmatic outburst, singularly denied, and ex-cathedra discarded even the possibility of the existence of any form of “ethnic cleansing.” Without critical thinking, they unleashed a barrage of insults and attacks at the imagined and greatly overblown “Hungarian enemy,” characterizations which included: “lies,” “baseless slander,” “defamation,” “mean-spirited falsification of Romanian realities,” “extremist anti-Romanian diatribe,” “irredentism,” “separatism,” “they sold out the country,” “the bishop is the devil’s pawn,” and so on.

In their massive outcry many sought to defend the “Romanian people” – as if the charge of “ethnic cleansing” had been leveled against them, and not against the homogenizing, nationalist governing authority. Thus, we have summarized the actual background of the nation-wide political scandal that was raised around the statement.

If there is – and there certainly is – a credible explanation and an actual motivation for the general public uproar, then it is exactly the national self-esteem and dignity of the misled Romanian masses, which was used and exploited by the well-paid experts of manipulation and provocation. The noble self-defense reflexes, aimed at protecting those national feelings which merit respect and appreciation, and the – well undermined – natural mechanisms of protecting collective self-respect, mislead even the best members of the democratic opposition and other undeniably well-meaning Romanians. The governing authority, fearfully protective of its power, and obsessed with the phobia of territorial loss – which it transposes onto the masses as well – wants to gain wider support and popular legitimacy, to mobilize society on its own side precisely by exploiting the psychosis of vulnerability, and the most noble nationalist sentiments, and through this process it wishes to realize its own selfish goals and interests.

The anti-Hungarian crusade around the “ethnic cleansing” statement was primarily a well-prepared trap, set up by the government and its allies for the – as yet – weak opposition and infant Romanian democracy. The deception was so successful, that in sporadic locations even the intimidated Hungarian population became confused, forcing several of its political leaders to directly or indirectly distance themselves, in this way unwillingly equating their own position with that of the government.

The Hungarians of Romania, however, unlike their fellow ethnic Romanian citizens, have an actual basis for, and a greater degree of “things to fear,” and their own no less noble national sentiments have been, for decades, and continue to be concretely offended daily. It is true that the totalitarian power takes advantage of both nationalities’ sentiments and conducts vulgar political games – but in the case of the Hungarian minority these games carry a much greater risk. The possible risk for Romanian society is “at most” democracy and freedom – while at the same time, in contrast, the governing authority puts the Hungarian community’s very existence at risk: its continued survival becomes questionable.

It is cheap demagoguery or naiveté, and a falsification of reality, a short-sighted simplification to group together the livelihood of the minority Hungarians and the state-forming Romanians, to one-sidedly equate the situation of the two ethnic groups, by saying that in the post-communist misery “Romanians and Hungarians suffer alike... they suffer hunger and cold alike, stand in line and feel intimidated alike.” This is also partly true – at the level of certain basic needs, and in the case of certain social classes. The Hungarian and other minorities, however, suffer “double discrimination” and oppression: not only as ordinary citizens, but also due to their nationality; their ethnic minority status.

When democracy is dealt a blow, they feel it the most. According to the “classic” practice used by governing nationalities, the minorities serve as the source for the distracting “enemy picture:” on top of this, they are also suitable for the scapegoat role. According to the “substitute victims” law, they can be sacrificed in the interest of the government and the constitutionally-sanctioned “Romanian nation-state.”

Then, it is misleading to speak of a majority and minority nationalism in the same breath, to call Romanian extremist nationalism and Hungarian national “radicalism” symmetrical, bestows the same value to them.

Minority nationalism is fundamentally of a defensive nature: disadvantaged from the start, it seeks to protect self-identity in the face of the majority nation’s artificially-developed aggressive, devastating nationalism.

In Romania, it is a misconception – one produced by the cynical manipulation of the government and the extreme nationalists – to believe that Romanians need fear the so-called “radical” or “irredentist” or “separatist” Hungarian “extremists.” The nationalist-communist regime, relying on nationalist ideology, achieves a dual goal by exploiting this misconception: it is able to keep the opposition and the nation’s progressive forces occupied with the minorities, while at the same time, it uses the majority to strike at the minorities, who, in their struggle for freedom, pose a – democratic – threat to its survival. It practices a nationalist, divisive policy, on the basis of which the minorities naturally always come up short.

It is in this majority-oriented power policy that the practice of “ethnic cleansing” forms an organic part. This is the policy which is behind the provocations, which – drawing on the analogy of the bloody Bosnian events – have shocking effects. Just like in the fables, as predators are apt to do, it is once again the wolf who warns the – sacrificial – lamb: “do not disturb the waters!”

* * *

We have been able to see what is behind the words, what function did this singular, out-of-context statement – deprived of its actual content or purposefully misinterpreted – serve in the hands of the pseudo-democratic totalitarian regime and the well-oiled propaganda machine of the national-communist power.

In the following section, free from any political tendency or nationalist government manipulation, we shall examine what the facts actually say. Let reality – one widely avoided, or purposefully ignored due to prejudice – the numbers, data, surveys, statistics, and our own painful experiences speak about the “ethnic cleansing” which has caused such a storm.

In 1930, on the present-day territory of Romania, the population was 14,281,000; today it is 22,760,000, an increase of more than 8 million. In contrast, the growth of the Hungarian population – according to official Romanian statistical data – was minimal, an increase of no more than 66,000 people: in 1930, there were 1,554,000, while in 1992 there were 1,620,000 (See Table 1).

Analyzing the statistics for Transylvania: during 82 years (1910-1992) the Romanian population doubled, while the Hungarian population declined from 1,664,000 to 1,599,000. Furthermore, its percentage of the total population for the region dropped from the nearly one-third (31.6%) to barely a fifth (20.7%). (See Table 2)

TABLE 1

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL HUNGARIAN POPULATION AND ITS PERCENTAGE IN THE TOTAL POPULATION OF ROMANIA

Romania	1930	1948	1956	1966	1977	1992
Total	18,057	15,873	17,489	19,103	21,560	22,760
Romanians	13,181	13,598	15,081	16,771	19,000	20,353
%	73.6	85.7	86.2	87.8	88.1	89.4
Hungarians	1,554	1,500	1,654	1,652	1,714	1,620
%	8.6	9.4	9.5	8.6	7.9	7.1

Note: The population figures are in thousands.

TABLE 2**DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL HUNGARIAN POPULATION AND ITS PERCENTAGE IN THE TOTAL POPULATION OF TRANSYLVANIA**

Transylvania	1910	1920	1930	1948	1956	1966	1977	1992
Total	5,263	5,063	5,548	5,761	6,232	6,720	7,500	7,710
Romanians	2,830	2,931	3,233	3,752	4,081	4,570	5,321	5,671
%	53.8	57.9	58.2	65.1	65.5	68	70.9	73.6
Hungarians	1,664	1,306	1,481	1,482	1,616	1,626	1,651	1,599
%	31.6	25.8	26.7	25.7	25.9	24.2	22	20.7

Note: The population figures are in thousands.

The data from Transylvanian counties inhabited by Hungarians paints an even clearer picture of the unnatural population decline. For example, in Kolozs County, one of the counties most heavily targeted by artificial Romanianization, during 82 years the Romanian population (rounding the numbers) increased from 230,700 to 570,700. In contrast, the Hungarian population declined from 156,300 to 145,400, or from 39.3% to 19.8% of the total population (See Table 3).

TABLE 3**DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL HUNGARIAN POPULATION AND ITS PERCENTAGE IN THE TRANSYLVANIAN COUNTIES**

County	Population	Year of census						
		1910	1920	1930	1956	1966	1977	1992
Arad	Total	570.7	482.3	488.4	475.6	481.2	512	487.4
	Romanians	294.2	289.4	307.6	322.3	346	375.5	392.2
	%	57.9	60.0	63.0	69.9	71.8	73.3	80.5
	Hungarians	130.6	105.4	103.2	86.8	78.3	74.1	60.9
	%	25.7	21.9	21.1	18.2	16.3	14.5	12.5
Beszterce-Naszód	Total	212.6	201.2	223.5	255.8	268.6	286.6	327.2
	Romanians	147.5	144.5	166.4	220.8	238.8	259.8	295.9
	%	69.5	71.8	74.6	86.3	89	90.6	90.4
	Hungarians	29.2	19.1	20.5	23.6	21.6	21.5	21.2
	%	13.7	9.5	9.2	9.2	8.0	7.5	6.5

County	Population	Year of census						
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Bihar	Total	475.9	478	527.2	574.5	586.5	633.1	634.1
	Romanians	242	261.6	306.3	359.5	374.3	409.8	419.1
	%	50.8	54.7	58.0	62.7	64.0	64.7	66.1
	Hungarians	218.2	174.3	193.8	204.2	198.1	199.6	180.7
	%	45.9	36.5	36.8	35.5	33.8	31.5	28.5
Brassó	Total	239.9	238.5	265.4	373.9	442.7	582.9	642.5
	Romanians	131.8	138.2	151.6	272.8	333.3	457.6	551.9
	%	54.9	58.0	57.1	73.0	75.3	78.5	85.9
	Hungarians	54.6	49.0	59.8	59.2	66.5	73.0	63.3
	%	22.8	20.5	22.5	15.8	15.0	12.5	9.8
Fehér	Total	330.8	320.6	346.6	370.8	382.8	409.6	414.2
	Romanians	262.9	264.1	290.6	327.2	341.4	360.7	373.5
	%	79.6	82.3	83.8	88.2	89.2	88.1	90.2
	Hungarians	45.5	35.0	34.0	27.3	26.7	27.2	24.8
	%	13.7	10.9	9.8	7.4	7.0	6.6	6.0
Hargita	Total	240.6	231.8	250.2	274	282.4	326.3	347.6
	Romanians	14.6	25.3	22.5	25.2	30.5	44.8	48.8
	%	6.1	10.9	9.0	9.2	10.8	13.7	14.0
	Hungarians	223.1	202.1	223.1	247	250.7	277.6	294.3
	%	92.7	87.2	89.1	90.2	88.7	85.1	84.6
Hunyad	Total	323.5	304.5	319.9	381.9	474.6	514.4	548
	Romanians	256.8	247.4	266.4	337.2	425.4	464.9	503.3
	%	79.4	81.2	83.3	88.3	89.6	90.4	91.9
	Hungarians	51.5	39.2	39.9	34.1	40.3	38.3	33.7
	%	15.9	12.9	12.5	8.9	8.5	7.5	6.1
Kolozs	Total	397.4	416.8	475.5	580.3	631.1	715.5	725.1
	Romanians	230.7	261.9	299.0	404.1	459.5	532.5	570.7
	%	58.0	62.8	62.8	69.6	72.8	74.4	77.6
	Hungarians	156.3	127.8	149.6	169	166.1	171.4	145.4
	%	39.3	30.7	31.5	29.1	26.3	24.0	19.8
Kovácszna	Total	148.9	147.0	152.6	172.5	176.9	199.0	232.6
	Romanians	17.1	24.9	25.2	30.7	33.8	38.9	54.5
	%	11.5	16.9	16.5	17.8	19.1	19.6	23.4
	Hungarians	130.2	120.4	126.1	140.7	142.3	156.1	175.0
	%	87.4	82.9	82.7	81.6	80.5	78.4	75.2

County	Population	Year of census						
Krassó-Szörény	Total	342	309.7	319.3	327.8	358.7	385.6	375.8
	Romanians	251	233.8	242.4	265.7	297.6	323.1	325
	%	73.3	75.5	75.9	81.0	83.0	83.8	86.5
	Hungarians	13.5	5.8	6.9	8.0	8.8	9.2	8.1
	%	4	1.8	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.2
Maros	Total	388.3	386.2	425.7	513.3	561.6	605.3	607.3
	Romanians	151.3	170.2	185.7	245.6	279.8	297.2	316.6
	%	39.0	44.1	43.6	47.9	49.1	49.1	52.1
	Hungarians	189.6	166.9	188.9	236.4	252.9	268.3	251
	%	48.8	43.2	44.4	46.0	45.0	44.3	41.3
Máramaros	Total	297.4	296.9	317.3	367.1	427.6	492.9	538.5
	Romanians	189.9	200.0	220.5	284.8	339.4	394.4	436.3
	%	63.9	67.3	69.4	77.6	79.3	80.0	81.0
	Hungarians	62.2	31.2	34.8	51.3	55.6	58.6	54.8
	%	20.9	10.5	11.0	14.0	13.0	11.9	10.2
Szatmár	Total	267.7	263.9	301.1	337.4	359.4	393.8	400.2
	Romanians	92.3	124.5	140.0	173.1	198.4	227.6	233.5
	%	34.5	47.3	46.4	51.3	55.2	57.8	58.4
	Hungarians	166.7	81.2	126.9	158.5	155.2	157.7	140.1
	%	62.3	30.9	42.2	47.0	43.2	38.8	35.0
Szeben	Total	270.6	270.5	307.0	372.7	414.8	481.6	452.8
	Romanians	155.7	158.4	181.4	262.6	295.3	349.7	397.5
	%	57.5	58.5	59.0	70.4	71.2	72.6	87.8
	Hungarians	20.4	14.5	19.2	17.9	19.9	21.9	19.2
	%	7.5	5.4	6.3	4.8	4.8	4.5	4.3
Szilágy	Total	223.1	218.8	240.8	272.0	263.1	274.6	266.3
	Romanians	150.2	150.5	169.9	201.0	195.1	194.4	192.2
	%	67.5	68.7	70.6	73.9	74.2	73.5	72.2
	Hungarians	66.7	55.1	57.6	67.5	64.0	64.0	63.2
	%	29.9	25.2	23.9	24.8	24.3	24.2	23.7
Temes	Total	560.7	512.9	559.6	568.9	607.6	696.9	700.3
	Romanians	223.9	217.1	238.8	328.1	380	472.9	560.1
	%	39.9	42.3	42.7	57.6	62.5	67.9	80.0
	Hungarians	96.8	74.3	91.9	84.5	78.8	77.5	63.4
	%	17.3	14.5	16.4	14.9	13	11.1	9.1

Table 4 and Chart 1 present the spectacular decline in population for the ethnic Hungarian minority. Within 82 years, its population proportion declined by more than 33%, from 31.6% to 20.7%. In the same period, other minority populations declined nearly 66%, from 14.6% to 5.7%. This is a textbook example of “ethnic cleansing” on all accounts.


TABLE 4

**THE DYNAMIC TRANSFORMATION OF
TRANSYLVANIA’S ETHNIC COMPOSITION**

	1910	1920	1930	1948	1956	1966	1977	1992
Total	5,263	5,063	5,548	5,761	6,232	6,720	7,500	7,710
Romanian	2,830	2,931	3,233	3,752	4,081	4,570	5,321	5,671
%	53.8	57.9	58.2	65.1	65.5	68	70.9	73.6
Hungarian	1,664	1,306	1,481	1,482	1,616	1,626	1,651	1,599
%	31.6	25.8	26.7	25.7	25.9	24.2	22	20.7
Other	769	826	834	527	535	524	528	440
%	14.6	16.3	15.1	19.2	19.6	17.8	7.1	5.7

CHART 1

**THE DYNAMIC TRANSFORMATION OF
TRANSYLVANIA’S ETHNIC COMPOSITION**



Charts 2 and 3 also present the extraordinary population shift achieved through “ethnic cleansing” on a nationwide basis; minority population declined and majority population increased.

CHART 2

THE DYNAMIC TRANSFORMATION OF TRANSYLVANIA'S ETHNIC COMPOSITION




CHART 3

THE DYNAMIC TRANSFORMATION OF TRANSYLVANIA'S ETHNIC COMPOSITION




Table 5 records the historic population decline in Hungarian inhabited territory. It is spectacular. It reveals the phenomenal success of the “forced assimilation” policy implemented by the Cold War communist regime.

TABLE 5

**THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF LARGE TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES
(BASED ON CENSUS DATA)**

City	Citizens	Year of census					
		1910	1930	1956	1966	1977	1992
Kolozsvár/ Cluj	Total	62.7	100.8	154.7	185.7	262.4	328.0
	Hungarians	51.2	54.8	74.2	76.0	85.4	74.5
	%	81.6	54.3	47.3	41.4	32.5	22.7
	Romanians	8.9	37.0	74.6		147.9	248.3
	%	14.2	35.6	48.2		56.3	75.7
Nagyvárad/ Oradea	Total	69.0	82.7	98.5	122.5	171.3	220.8
	Hungarians	63.0	55.0	58.4	63.0	75.7	73.3
	%	91.3	66.6	59.1	51.4	44.2	33.2
	Romanians	3.8	21.8	34.5		91.9	143.2
	%	5.5	24.5	34.9		53.9	64.8
Temesvár/ Timișoara	Total	72.6	91.6	142.3	174.2	268.8	334.3
	Hungarians	28.6	27.7	30.0	33.1	36.2	32.0
	%	39.3	30.2	21.1	17.8	13.5	9.6
	Romanians	7.6	24.1	76.2		166.8	274.2
	%	10.4	26.3	53.5		62.1	82.0
Marosvásárhely/ Târgu-Mureș	Total	25.5	38.5	65.2	86.5	130.1	163.6
	Hungarians	22.8	25.4	48.1	60.2	82.2	83.7
	%	89.3	65.8	73.8	69.6	63.2	51.1
	Romanians	1.7	9.5	14.3		45.6	75.8
	%	6.7	24.6	21.9		35.1	46.3

City	Citizens	Year of census					
		1910	1930	1956	1966	1977	1992
Arad	Total	76.4	77.2	106.5	126	171.1	190.1
	Hungarians	48.4	30.0	31.9	31.0	34.3	29.8
	%	63.4	38.8	30.0	24.6	20.0	15.7
	Romanians	14.6	30.4	59.1		101.5	151.3
	%	19.1	36.2	55.5		59.3	79.6
Brassó/ Braşov	Total	41.1	59.2	124.8	163.3	257.2	323.8
	Hungarians	17.8	23.3	22.7	27.8	34.0	31.3
	%	43.4	39.3	18.3	17.0	13.2	9.7
	Romanians	11.8	19.4	88.7		195.7	287.6
	%	28.7	32.7	71.6		76.3	88.8
Szatmár/ Satu Mare	Total	34.9	51.5	52.1	69.8	103.6	131.9
	Hungarians	33.1	30.3	31.2	34.5	47.6	53.8
	%	94.8	58.9	59.9	49.4	45.9	40.8
	Romanians	1.0	13.9	15.8		41.3	72.9
	%	2.8	27.1	30.3		39.9	55.3
Nagybánya/ Baia Mare	Total	16.5	16.6	35.9	64.5	101	148.8
	Hungarians	10.7	6.5	15.3	20.6	25.3	25.7
	%	64.8	39.2	42.6	31.9	25.0	17.3
	Romanians	5.5	8.5	18.8		64.0	119.5
	%	33.7	50.8	52.2		63.4	80.3
Zilah/ Zalău	Total	8.1	8.3	13.4	15.1	31.9	68.3
	Hungarians	7.5	5.9	6.9		13.4	13.5
	%	92.7	71.1	51.1		42.0	19.8
	Romanians	0.5	2.1	6.4		18.2	54.0
	%	6.6	24.7	48.1		57.0	79.1
Csíksereda/ Miercurea Ciuc	Total	6.8	8.3	12.0	15.3	30.9	46.0
	Hungarians	6.7	7.4	11.2		24.9	38.2
	%	97.8	89	93.7		80.6	83.0
	Romanians	0.04	0.7	0.7		5.6	7.5
	%	0.6	7.9	5.5		10.1	16.3

City	Citizens	Year of census					
		1910	1930	1956	1966	1977	1992
Sepsiszent- györgy/ Sfântu Gheorghe	Total		10.8	17.6	20.8	40.8	68.1
	Hungarians		8.4	15.3			50.9
	%		77.2	86.8			74.7
	Romanians		2.0	2.2			16.0
	%		18.7	12.4			23.5
Székelyudvar- hely/ Odorheiu Secuiesc	Total		10.0	14.2	18.2	28.7	40.0
	Hungarians		8.7	13.6			38.9
	%		87.5	96.2			97.4
	Romanians		1	0.5			0.8
	%		9.5	3.2			2.1
Totals of the above cities	Total	413.6	555.5	837.2	1,061.9	1,597.8	2,063.7
	Hungarians	289.8	283.4	358.8	346.2	459	545.6
	%	71.0	51.0	43.0	33.0	28.0	26.0
	Romanians	55.4	170.4	391.8		878.5	1,451.1
	%	13.4	30.6	48.0		55.0	70.0

Note:

- The population figures are in thousands, for example: 62.7=62,700.
- The 1966 Census contains only data for eight cities on the list.

Charts 4 and 5 present the ethnic composition of the 10 largest Transylvanian cities. These charts depict the shocking demographic metamorphosis of Transylvania. Visually, the twin-sets of charts (6 & 7), (8 & 9), (10 & 11), depict the total achievement of “forced assimilation” for Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca), Nagyvárad (Oradea), and Temesvár (Timisoara), respectively. These were formerly majority population Hungarian cities, but are now minority Hungarian cities; a stunning inverse relationship, within 82 years.

This wholesale reversal in population mix is not organic or natural. Obviously, it was designed, implemented; and inculcated into the Romanian leadership. This is an extraordinary feat that has relegated the once dominant Hungarian population in Transylvania to minority status.

CHART 4

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF 10 LARGE TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES




CHART 5

TOTAL ROMANIAN AND HUNGARIAN POPULATION OF 10 LARGE TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES




CHART 6

KOLOZSVÁR (CLUJ-NAPOCA): DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC COMPOSITION




CHART 7

TOTAL ROMANIAN AND HUNGARIAN POPULATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF KOLOZSVÁR (CLUJ-NAPOCA)




CHART 8

NAGYVÁRAD (ORADEA): DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC COMPOSITION




CHART 9

NAGYVÁRAD (ORADEA): DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC COMPOSITION




CHART 10

TEMESVÁR (TIMISOARA): DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC COMPOSITION





CHART 11

TOTAL ROMANIAN AND HUNGARIAN POPULATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF TEMESVÁR (TIMISOARA)



As alluded to earlier, these are not the results of natural demographic processes. A secret document, found at the end of 1989 in the city hall building of Marosvásárhely (Targu Mures), gives us positive proof that the Romanian authorities deliberately and artificially altered the ethnic composition of various cities within Transylvania, and within the whole Transylvanian region.

The secret document and supporting notation is presented on the following pages. The directive specifically focuses on attaining a majority population (by the then minority Romanian population of Marosvásárhely). Further, it mandates a five-year plan to attain a target Romanian population proportion of 58-60%, within that time period.

It is these massive “forced assimilation” policies of Romanianizing Transylvania, achieved by using administrative tools, and the processes of industrialization and urbanization, that explain the radical transformation of the ethnic composition of Transylvania. The continuous resettlement of the so-called “closed-cities” system, the unnecessary territorial and ethnic merging of villages, and other administrative reorganizations are merely a few of the more outstanding methods of the systematically planned reductions of the ethnic Hungarian community of Transylvania.

DOCUMENT 1

THIS TOP SECRET DOCUMENT, PREPARED IN THREE COPIES, WAS THE REPORT OF MR. IOAN UNGUR, THEN FIRST COUNTY PARTY-SECRETARY, IN 1985.

Note about the ethnic composition of the population of the municipality of Marosvásárhely (Tirgu Mures)

Una documentatie secretiva este transmisa comitetului Judetean FACTU

N O T A

Prin prezenta se prezinta populatia si structura etnica a Municipality Tirgu Mures

- La recensamantul din 1977 populatia municipiului Tirgu Mures era: 130.051

- din care:	46.558 romani	(35,8%)
	81.151 ungari	(62,4%)
	3.342 alte etnii	(2,8%)

- La inceputul anului 1985 populatia municipiului Tirgu Mures era: 154.904

- din care:	66.420 romani	(42,9%)
	85.178 ungari	(55,9%)
	3.308 alte etnii	(2,2%)

- Pentru ca structura etnica din municipiul Tirgu Mures sa fie de tipul celui din Ungaria si sa ajunga la 50% din totalul populatiei este necesar ca in urmatoarele perioade sa se realizeze in municipiul Tirgu Mures o crestere a populatiei de etnie romana de aproximativ 7.000 persoane pe an, ceea ce este posibil, avand in vedere ca populatia municipiului Tirgu Mures este de aproximativ 150.000 persoane, iar rata natalitatii este de aproximativ 10-12‰.

Tirgu Mures 1 noiembrie 1985

(poor quality Romanian original)

In the 1977 census, the population of the municipality of Marosvásárhely (Tirgu Mures) was 130,051.

Of these:	46,558 were Romanians	(35.8%)
	81,151 were Hungarians	(62.4%)
	3,342 were of other ethnicity	(1.8%)

In the beginning of 1985, the population of the municipality of Marosvásárhely was 154,904.

Of these:	66,420 were Romanians	(42.9%)
	85,178 were Hungarians	(55.9%)
	3,308 were of other ethnicity	(1.2%)

In order for the Romanian population in the municipality of Marosvásárhely to reach 50% within the next two years, it is required that during this period approval be given for 7,600 industrial jobs for ethnic Romanian individuals. Counting an average of three persons per family, this would equal 22,800 individuals, which makes it possible to achieve a 58-60% ethnic Romanian population in Marosvásárhely by the end of the next five year period (end of 1990).

Dated at Marosvásárhely,
November 1, 1985.

The misled Romanian population, however, is completely unaware of the above processes. Instead of abandoning its anti-minority policies – as it promised during the changes in 1989 – which draw on traditional practices, the government is contributing to the increase of anti-Hungarian rhetoric and propaganda. Directly or indirectly, this aids efforts aimed at national homogenization, which, in our words, is synonymous with “ethnic cleansing.”

An outstanding example, the founding pillar and an unappealable document of this nationalist course is the first clause of the Romanian Constitution. It defines our country – inhabited by several million other nationalities – as a “unitary nation-state.” Consequently, the homogenizing, “ethnic cleansing” policies are codified and consecrated into a national-political program by the most fundamental law of the country.

The weak Romanian opposition, lacking a well-developed concept of national policy, or due to its unfamiliarity with the situation, mostly assists the constitutionally-sanctioned, anti-minority program of the Romanian government and the parties in power. Other than its weak expressions of sympathy for the minorities, it is either seemingly poisoned by the Greater-Romanian nationalism or it is under its forceful domination (unable to offer a realistic and just political alternative for the country’s minorities, including almost two million ethnic Hungarians.)

The Romanian government is unable to grasp a deeper understanding of minority problems, and cannot even come face-to-face with the facts of “ethnic cleansing” – as witnessed by the opposition parties’ unified stance, siding with the inciteful, nationalist, provocative scandal-making forces of authority.

Unfortunately, neither the opposition, nor the well-meaning but misled Romanian citizens have yet realized that with alternating, refined methods, “ethnic cleansing” continues even today. Now, there is a special emphasis on lowering the social status of Hungarians, forcing them out or into the background of society.

The Germans and the Hungarians are emigrating, leaving their homelands forever. This is occurring in far greater numbers than warranted by their national population proportion.

TABLE 6
EMIGRATION STATISTICS 1990-1992

Year	Total	Romanian	German	Hungarian	Other
1990	144,543	25,583	95,900	18,821	4,239
1991	43,544	18,307	16,767	7,494	976
1992	34,583	17,922	8,845	6,673	1,143
Totals – 3 years	222,670	61,812	121,512	32,988	6,358
Total minorities:	160, 858				
Percentage of total emigrants:	Romanians - 27.76% Other ethnic groups - 72.24%				

In absolute numbers, the number of Romanian emigrants is 61,812 or 1.1% of the Romanian population. The number of ethnic immigrants totals 160,858 or 7.9% of the ethnic population.

However, if the emigration ratio is adjusted for population, the number of Romanians emigrating should have been 12.5 times (20,353,000/1,620,000) greater than the number of Hungarians.

As such, the population adjusted emigration rate for Romanians should have been 412,350 – not 61,812 (See Table 6 and Table 1).

CHART 12

**EMIGRATION OF ROMANIANS
AND OTHER NATIONALITY, IN 1990**




CHART 13

**EMIGRATION OF ROMANIANS
AND OTHER NATIONALITY, IN 1991**





CHART 14

**EMIGRATION OF ROMANIANS
AND OTHER NATIONALITY, IN 1992**



The reasons for the Hungarian emigration – besides economic ones – are chiefly ones of ethnic nature. One example is Marosvásárhely, whose Hungarian inhabitants and whose youth have left their place of birth by the thousands, in wake of the intimidating atmosphere created by the Vatra pogrom attempts of March 1990. The discriminating judicial decisions, handed down against a number of the participants of the December 1989 events in the Székelyföld region (East Transylvania, with a majority Hungarian population), in Zetelaka or Oroszhegy, have had the same alienating effect among the ethnic Hungarian minority.

A similar reaction is produced among the Hungarian masses when we consider our disadvantaged educational situation, the higher-than-average unemployment ratio of Hungarian workers, our large-scale displacement from various spheres of social life (government and institutional leadership, administration, the rail, postal and health institutions, etc.), the autocratic reduction of the length of the Hungarian language television programs, and the unjust appointment of ethnic Romanian prefects in the counties of Hargita and Kovászna.

Charts 15 & 16 highlight the fact that 31% of Hungarian students have no opportunity to be educated in their mother tongue. Specifically, it is the area of academic studies and technical training, where the disadvantaged, under-represented situation of the Hungarian students can be seen: only 60.4% of collegiate and 22.7% of technical school students can study in their mother tongue. The situation is also critical in the area of teacher-training – 26% of the pedagogues who participate in native language instruction are unqualified!

Obviously, this restricts the ethnic Hungarian community's earning-capacity for another generation.

CHART 15

PERCENTAGE OF HUNGARIAN STUDENTS WHO STUDY IN THEIR MOTHER TONGUE





CHART 16

LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION FOR HUNGARIAN STUDENTS IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM



Hungarians have been almost squeezed out of local and county state administration. There are virtually no Hungarian employees in the prefectures and mayoral offices. The proportion of ethnic Hungarians in the institutes of justice is also ridiculously low. In counties like Bihar, Szatmár, and Szilágy, where Hungarians make up a significant number of the population, there is not a single Hungarian notary public.

Hungarians are also discriminated against in economic spheres. In state companies, a Hungarian individual can very rarely reach an executive position. Even in Kovászna County, which has an absolute Hungarian majority, the number of Hungarian business executives is proportionately small.

TABLE 7

THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE HUNGARIANS OF ROMANIA FROM VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS

	Prefectorate		County Council		Mayoral Office				
	%		%		%				
County of Arad	12.5			5 of 110	4.5				
Arad	15.7					1 of 66	1.5		
County of Bihar	28.5	4 of 117	3.4	3 out of 183	1.6				
Nagyvárad	33.2					3 out of 89	3.4		
County of Szatmár	35.0	18 of 129	14.0						
Szatmárnémeti	40.8								
County of Szilágy	23.7		9.0						
Zilah	19.8						7.5		
County of Kolozs	19.8								
Kolozsvár	22.7					8 of 168	4.8		
County of Hargita	84.7	14 of 41	34.1	75 of 85	88.2				
Csíksereda	83.0					47 of 56	83.9		

		Prefecture		County Council		Mayoral Office			
County of Kovászna	75.2	13 of 51	39.4						
Sepsiszentgyörgy	74.8								
		Notaries public		Lawyers		Public prosecutors		Judges	
	%		%		%		%		%
County of Arad	12.5							1 of 38	2.6
Arad	15.7			4 of 66	6.1				
County of Bihar	28.5					1 of 12	8.3	1 of 12	8.3
Nagyvárad	33.2			9 of 122	7.4	1 of 17	5.9	2 of 21	9.5
County of Szatmár	35.0					1 of 7	14.3	1 of 7	14.3
Szatmárnémeti	40.8								
County of Szilágy	23.7			8 of 36	22.2	1 of 10	10.0	0 of 14	0.0
Zilah	19.8								18.0
County of Kolozs	19.8				17.4				
Kolozsvár	22.7								
County of Hargita	84.7					2 of 5	40.0	2 of 4	50.0
Csikszereida	83.0			26 of 65	38.5	1 of 4	25.0	2 of 7	28.6
County of Kovászna	75.2					3 of 6	50.0	1 of 6	16.7
Sepsiszentgyörgy	74.8			10 of 19	52.6	2 of 5	40.0	2 of 6	33.3

CHART 17

RATIO OF ETHNIC HUNGARIANS AMONGST THE LEADERSHIP OF STATE-OWNED COMPANIES IN VARIOUS COUNTIES AND CITIES





CHART 18

RATIO OF HUNGARIAN STREET-NAMES IN VARIOUS LARGER TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES



We conclude by stating the obvious: state policies discriminate against minorities and treat them as second class Romanian citizens. Consequently, this is what is meant by the expression “ethnic cleansing,” as interpreted by the Hungarians of Romania.

These are the facts – the rest is ignorance, political evasion, misinterpretation, or purposeful nationalist, instigating propaganda. The White Book of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ), currently being prepared, will no doubt present an even wider array and a more convincing picture of the reality of the ethnic Hungarian minority’s existence in Romania.

I write these lines from within the – now twice – confiscated Bishop’s Office of the Királyhágómellék Reformed Church District. Meanwhile, I face possible eviction at any given moment. As I write, I recall that my street is named after Marshall Ion Antonescu, the Romanian fascist dictator. This city was founded by Hungarian King, Saint László. Currently, this former Hungarian city has only 8 (!) of 746 streets names that are of Hungarian origin.

Dated at Nagyvárad, 21 April 1993

László Tőkés,

Bishop,
Reformed Church in Romania,
Királyhágómellék District